THE STORY OF A SUSPENDED AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE, AN UNPRECEDENTED CASE IN CAPE VERDE'S AVIATION HISTORY!

Once again in the name of citizenship, I will try to explain a little about aeronautics to non-aeronautics, not because I am a “prophet of doom”, an “engineer of chaos”, an “unhappy” or “populist”; not even because I'm a candidate for this or that, it was just what was missing, it doesn't remind the devil, not even the "Molosso" on duty! The aim is to inform ordinary citizens like me, the taxpayer, about matters of paramount importance, but which, taking into account their specificities, few follow as we would like them to, taking into account their impact on our economy and lives.

In the aeronautical world and beyond, and I have already mentioned this here before, we learn wherever we go that there are situations in which the relationship between the regulator and some regulated companies become “cordial”, “...may become too close... ”, due to very specific circumstances, giving rise to what the Anglo-Saxons call “...opportunistic behavior by the regulator...” what happens is highly perverse, destabilizing and harmful, with serious impacts on users/consumers , levels of service practiced and operational safety in general.

We also learned where we went that, among other missions, the aeronautical authorities, the regulators, taking into account the characteristics and specificities of the sector, exist to defend the operators, the operators, the market, the technicians, the pilots from themselves! This is profound: write it down, defend them from themselves! This says a lot about the importance and complexity of the role of inspectors, auditors and supervisors in the performance and fulfillment of their intricate, remarkable and consecrated missions in the aeronautical world; this says a lot about the conflicts and permanent tension between regulations, standards, procedures, recommended practices and the interests/objectives/targets of this or that manager, this or that operator, and the relevance of the human factor in aviation, in its “ tense” relationship between its own genesis versus the genesis of the Flight Operation Process as a whole and its optimization, in the broadest sense.

It is this dimension of AAC's mission that government officials have not understood until today, leading them in these last seven years to instil in the heart of the sector, illegitimately and, obeying criteria as well as purely political-media objectives, a culture of condescension and “protectionism” towards the operators, resulting, on the one hand, in a visible atrophy in activities, in the reputation/prestige of the competent authority and, on the other hand, in an impoverishment of service levels and technical-operational performance of the regulated players, visible to the distance and felt in the skin of all those who demand air transport via the two national operators.

The last episode, which culminated in the suspension of the Airworthiness Certificate of one of Best Fly's aircraft, by the AAC Airworthiness Department which, we recognize, did very well (CV CAR 5.B.255), is an outcome that only sins for late and not be more penalizing for Best Fly, otherwise let's see:

For a long time now, any attentive observer has clearly pointed out a management deficit in its broadest sense, and of operational risks at the BestFly operator; in just over 2 years of operation, we noted that 2 Maintenance Directors resigned, fight scenes between a Quality Director Vs a Maintenance Director; the Director of Quality and Safety was dismissed, dismissing the Director of Flight Operations from his duties, followed by his demotion as Flight Instructor, becoming Pilot in Command only; the Training Director fired, the person responsible for Cabin Personnel training resigned;

The wage bill was considerably reduced, several maintenance technicians were dismissed; countless acts of bad operational and commercial practice with internal and external impacts (service providers, users) implying several operational disruptions due to lack of stock of units (parts); this despite the fact that there is a supposed contract with a supplier of units, it being more than proven that the efficiency of the contract is null(!), resulting in the same thing as having no stock, that is, an expedient to circumvent the regulation that obliges the player to have a minimum stock of extra units (was this ever audited and retained by the AAC?); do not, and never have, paid the slightest attention to their obligations with regard to the rights of passengers in situations of disruption, and these obligations are not covered by either the operator or CONNECT, which sells the BestFly operation in Cape Verde (AAC does not know this?);

Evident and clamorous technical incapacity in the management of such a publicized dossier, such as the promised introduction of a medium-haul aircraft (E-Jet 190) and the start of international operations, in a process in which the planning and management capacity of the process, showed all the possibilities weaknesses and ills of the house; unacceptable that in an aeronautical environment and ecosystem like ours or on other coasts, an operator takes more than 15 months (and continues to add setbacks in the process) continually failing at each stage, with the device (E-Jet 190) parked on the plate " ulcerating”, without being able to certify it, with all the costs associated with an immobilized aircraft.

In the industry, where all parties are committed to doing their homework rigorously and according to the rules, a certification process cannot take more than 90 days, any time reference above that is ridiculous, it is a sign that something very wrong is happening within the player, its ability to manage, operate and successfully exploit the equipment in question, as well as its expertise in managing complex processes such as those related to the Flight Operations Process in its broadest sense and essential in any carrier, even being on a blacklist or not! The mistakes made by the operator in this distressing certification process, combined with the successive and intense internal phenomena in two years, as well as BestFly's technical-operational performance should have triggered the alarm at AAC, a long time ago!

They were too many flags to be/were ignored by the regulatory authority! The facts that we bring here and others that we do not point out, due to their extreme sensitivity, we deduce that they are known to the AAC, at the very least they required measures of a closer and more “ostensive” supervision, as well as the design of corrective measures plans correspondents; in other cases, investigation aimed at applying other measures, clarifying so many internal “phenomena”, occurrences, breakdowns and cancellations in such an intense and dense way, in such a short time.

It is on this basis that it is legitimate to ask whether the AAC really should have suspended the AOC for this operator, since it is evident that an RCA (Root Cause Analysis) will, in my opinion, find a whole culture, practices and procedures that put at risk the company's operations, therefore the safety of passengers! Preventing the aircraft from operating does not solve the internal problems that are undermining the operator, as the prevailing culture runs its course.

A PCA that brings an aeronautical tire without the required documentation and evidence that allow technicians and aeronautical authorities to trace it, as required by regulations; brings with him a mechanic from another stop without being certified to proceed with the fitting of that same tire on an aircraft as if it were a bus or wagon tire, he must be subject to severe punishment at the end of a process and be inhibited from managing any airline! That same aeronautical tire that was rejected by technicians in our country, certified and able to replace tires and who ended up refusing to sign the "release" filled out by the illegitimate mechanic but who could not sign, leads to the unprecedented decision to suspend the Certificate of Airworthiness. As the PCA is personally involved in this, to say the least, sulphurous process, in this serious non-compliance; given the aforementioned background, in my opinion we have a serious underlying problem here and that the AOC should be withdrawn from the operator, since what happened with the D4-BFA could very well happen again with the D4-BFB as the culture of bad practices, of the “little way”, of being easy, is rooted and dominant, it predominates and is intoxicating us in terms of quality and safety of our until now reputed assembled system.

It is the first time in the history of aviation in Cape Verde that the Airworthiness Certificate is suspended, withdrawn from an operator; an operator to whom the state handed a monopoly on a platter and in which the state is a shareholder, put our money there and has an administrator on the CA. How did the state shareholder react to this very serious episode? Who is “accountable” before us users in this domestic market, before us the zealous taxpayers who put our money there?

What happens to the Post Holders accepted by the AAC whose main role and mission is to ensure operational safety, that is, where are the Accountable Manager, Flight Operations Director, Maintenance Director, Quality Director, Operational Security Director, the Captain of the Flight in question...(?) – what was the role of this Staff, of this finest flower of any operator in this caricatured and relevant event? Would you like to see AAC open this Pandora's Box..., or will "Pandora" be ordered by "Zeus" from Palácio da Várzea to throw the box with its contents away? It's just that Ulyssian mythology already manages to surpass Greek mythology by far, a myth that actually surpasses any fertile imagination of the type of Hephaestus.

As a certificate suspension, taking into account the circumstances, with everything attributable solely to the operator, he cannot resort to leasing another aircraft. This will have a huge impact on the mobility and agenda/life of those who demand BestFly; we will once again have more bottlenecks, less frequencies, less flexibility, less efficiency.

How does the State shareholder think to handle this issue in light of the company's current governance? Will the AC go down? The Administrator representing the State falls(?); the Post Holders, the Accountable Manager, the DOV, the Quality Director, the Operational Safety Director, the Operator Maintenance Director and OMA how are they going to look in this photograph?

Mr. MF-VPM, who is a specialist in communicating with the market on behalf of private hotels, on behalf of private economic operators, on behalf of TACV and a specialist in “posting” photographs, does not bring us any “photographs” of this fantastic scene( ?); doesn't comment on anything in this clamorous imbroglio in a company subsidized by the State? Don't you owe us an explanation? Taking into account the impact of this unprecedented case in the history of our civil aviation, in public opinion and in the minds of all of us, impact on the market, demand, reputation, credibility and trust required for the normal functioning of the business and related activities, explanations were and are a must, Mr MF-VPM. In air transport this is foreseen, a norm, a highly recommended good practice!

Do you know why Mr MF-VPM, the specialist in political merchandising, is silent in this process? The fact is that the government literally has its back on the ropes, on its knees in the ring, on this issue of air transport! Subjected to all kinds of blackmail from BestFly who have already threatened us with leaving because he knows the power he holds at the moment, hence his silence Mr MF-VPM! It's just that after 7 years, our air transport was dismantled, we started to operate on a razor's edge, with creed in our mouth, everything unpredictable, with less frequencies, less connectivity, less flexibility, less routes, more expensive tickets, low level of stopover service and passenger assistance 0.0! Reputation is not even mentioned, ours in the streets of the bitterness of the market!

Is that Mr. MF-VPM knows that Administrator Sá Nogueira (also MTT Advisor, see this imbroglio) that you placed there, is responsible for identifying and assessing the risks associated with BestFly's operations and ensuring that they are managed in a effectively, to minimize any exposure to the State; as a representative of the State shareholder, Mr. MF-VPM knows that this Administrator needs to monitor and supervise the operator's activities to ensure that they are in accordance with the guidelines, laws and policies established by him and by the authorities of the sector;

Mr MF-VPM knows that Administrator Sá Nogueira (also MTT Advisor, have you noticed the imbroglio?) that he placed there, it is his role to contribute with strategic insights and actively participate in discussions to help shape the carrier so that the performance of the it brings benefits to the State shareholder and not damages and bad reputation for the same.

Mr. MF-VPM, Managers, Technicians, Inspectors, Auditors, Mr Administrator Sá Nogueira (MTT Advisor, do you see this imbroglio?)..., know (for some remember!!) that bad practices, Complacency, compromise, compromise, non-conformities in air transport, in the field of operations and Safety, often result in deaths, homicides (reckoning has already happened) and jail! And that today's world is not that of the nineties! Can you sleep peacefully?

Original article published by the author on facebook